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ABSTRACT 
The Associations between Depressive Rumination Subtypes and Dysphoria:  
Implications for Depression  
 
Nathida Siriapaipant 
Depressive rumination is repetitive thought about one‘s depressive symptoms, 
their causes, meanings, and potential consequences. Research has shown that depressive 
rumination is associated with dysphoria. Depressive rumination has been shown to 
consist of subtypes, with some subtypes being potentially less adaptive than others. 
Research using the Rumination on Sadness Scale (Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 
2000) has identified two rumination subtypes: meaning searching and repetitive 
thinking.Meaning searching reflects one‘s attempt to understand and find meaning in 
one‘s sadness, whereas repetitive thinking reflects repetitiveness and uncontrollability of 
one‘s thoughts on one‘s sadness. Two hypotheses were made.First, repetitive thinking, 
but not meaning searching,was hypothesized to lead to more dysphoria over time. 
Second, it was hypothesized that meaning searching would lead to more repetitive 
thinking, and repetitive thinking would lead to more meaning searching over time. 
Participants in this 2-year longitudinal study were 349 older adults who had recently 
retired. The findings did not support the first hypothesis. In contrast, findings indicated 
thatdysphoria may lead to more repetitive thinking. As for the second hypothesis, 
meaning searching predicted increased repetitive thinking, and repetitive thinking led to 
more meaning searching a year later although these associations were not strong. These 
findings emerged when taking into account several factors related to dysphoria and 
depressive rumination, including neuroticism, control beliefs, age, and gender. Based on 
   
iv 
these findings, it can be argued that depressive rumination might be more suitably 
conceptualized as a symptom of depression rather than a process that leads to more 
depression.  
   
v 
Acknowledgements 
 First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Michael Conway, for 
this thesis would not have been possible without his guidance and support. He is 
undoubtedly a living example of a good researcher. It has been an honour to be part of his 
research group for the past two years. I have been, and will always be, grateful for his 
help and understanding.  
 I would also like to thank my labmates, Pino Alfonsi and Nassim Tabri. Without 
their help, the statistical part of this thesis would have been far more overwhelming than 
it was. Their insights and comments have always been much appreciated. 
 I would like to thank my family and friends who have been supporting me 
throughout this entire process. I can never thank them enough for believing in me more 
than I ever believe in myself. To Dao (N), Praew, Giff, Lu, and P‘Hong, thank you for 
encouraging me and helping me maintain my sanity during difficult times. I know you 
cannot wait until the word ―thesis‖ is forever eradicated from our conversations. All of 
you deserve a gold medal (or a cupcake) for being such good friends.  
Lastly, my studies in Canada would never have happened without the financial 
support from The Royal Thai Government. It has been an honour to be a recipient of its 






   
vi 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures………………………………………………………………………..viii 
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………….…ix 
 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..1  
 Definition of repetitive thought…………………………………………………1 
 Characteristics that determine the unconstructiveness of repetitive thought…...1 
 Depressive rumination…………………………………………………………..4 
 The Response Styles Theory……………………………………………………5 
 Other types of rumination……………………………………………………….6 
 Depressive rumination and dysphoria…………………………………………..9 
 Limitations in previous studies on depressive rumination and dysphoria…......11 
 Positive perception of depressive rumination………………………………….15 
 Stability of depressive rumination…………………………………………......17 
 Mechanisms of depressive rumination…………………………………………18 
 Subtypes of depressive rumination…………………………………………......23 
 The RRS: Reflective pondering vs. Brooding………………………………….24 
 The Rumination on Sadness Scale (RSS)………………………………………28 











Appendix A: Consent Form for Retirement Study……………………………………..67 
Appendix B: Demographics Questionnaire for Recent Retirees……………………….68 
 
   
viii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Final model of meaning searching, repetitive thinking, and dysphoria… 45 
 
   
ix 
List of Tables 
Table I. Descriptive statistics and correlations between all measures in the model… 40
 1 
The associations between depressive rumination subtypes and dysphoria:  
Implications for depression 
Definition of Repetitive Thought  
Various types of thinking are characterized by their repetitive nature. Segerstrom, 
Stanton, Alden, and Shortridge (2003) defined repetitive thought as a ―process of 
thinking attentively, repetitively, or frequently about oneself and one‘s world‖ (p. 909). 
By this definition, the thought content is not of primary focus because the definition does 
not specify the particular content of repetitive thought. To be considered repetitive, a 
thought has to recur frequently enough, and individuals have to maintain attention to the 
thought. This definition is rather inclusive; many thoughts could be categorized as 
repetitive ones. One way to distinguish repetitive thought from other types of thought 
may have to do with the extent of thinking. To be considered repetitive, a thought should 
be quite occupying, recurring repeatedly and persistently at least for a period of time that 
is considered relatively long by the individual, and the time interval between each 
thought occurrence is relatively short. Implicit in this definition is the personal 
significance of the content of repetitive thought to the individual.  
Characteristics that Determine the Unconstructiveness of Repetitive Thought  
Several types of repetitive thought, such as rumination, worry, and reflection, 
have been studied. Different repetitive thoughts are likely to be associated with different 
consequences. Some repetitive thoughts are related to more adaptive outcomes, whereas 
others are associated with more maladaptive consequences. Watkins (2008) reviewed 
experimental, cross-sectional, and longitudinal studies on repetitive thought and 
identified characteristics of repetitive thought that seemed to determine how constructive 
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or unconstructive repetitive thoughts may be. These characteristics are valence, 
intrapersonal and situational context, and level of construal. Watkins (2008) found that in 
terms of valence, when individuals‘ repetitive thought content is more negative, 
individuals are generally likely to experience more unconstructive consequences. Overall, 
when the content of repetitive thought is positive, individuals are less likely to experience 
negative affect. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that positive valence can contribute to 
hypomania or mania in some individuals.  
The second characteristic identified by Watkins (2008) was intrapersonal and 
situational contexts, which are the conditions under which repetitive thought occurs. The 
intrapersonal context, or within-self context, includes individuals‘ dispositional traits, 
mood, and beliefs about self. For instance, the consequences of engaging in worry, which 
is defined as repetitive thought focused on potential negative events in the future 
(Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & Dupree, 1983), are partly influenced by individuals‘ 
levels of anxiety. Those who are more anxious tend to experience more unconstructive 
consequences of worry than those who are less anxious (Watkins, 2008). The other type 
of context, which is the situational context, is the situation or environment in which the 
individuals are when they experience repetitive thoughts. For example, for individuals 
who are highly anxious about social interactions, they experience increased negative 
affect if they ruminate about their interactions in which they disclose personal 
information to others, but they experience a decrease in negative affect after thinking 
about their participation in small talk with others (Kashdan & Roberts, 2007).  
Another factor identified by Watkins (2008) as a determinant of the 
constructiveness of repetitive thought is levels of construal of the repetitive thought. 
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High-level construals are abstract, decontextualized, and analytic, whereas low-level 
construals are concrete, specific and experiential. Examples of high-level construals 
include making inferences about global dispositions about oneself and others (e.g., being 
lazy), which implies consistency across situations, or looking at the ―why‖ aspects of an 
action. In contrast, low-level construals may involve explaining another person‘s actions 
in terms of the person‘s current state (e.g., being tired), which varies across situations, or 
looking at the ―how‖ aspects of the action (Watkins, 2008). It is the interaction between 
construal level and other characteristics, and not construal level alone, that may 
determine how unconstructive a repetitive thought is, such that more abstract, negative 
repetitive thoughts are likely to be unconstructive (Watkins, 2008). Kross, Ayduk, and 
Mischel (2005) also found that the impact of the level of abstractness of repetitive 
thought can be a function of perspective. Individuals who processed their negative 
emotions from their past interpersonal experiences in an abstract and distanced manner 
(i.e., from a third-person perspective) experienced less negative affect than those who 
processed their negative emotions concretely or abstractly but from the first-person 
perspective (Kross et al., 2005). 
Apart from the characteristics identified by Watkins (2008) as contributing to the 
constructiveness of repetitive thought, individuals‘ purpose in engaging in repetitive 
thought may also partially impact on the outcome. According to Segerstrom, Stanton, 
Alden, and Shortridge (2003), two main purposes of repetitive thought are searching and 
solving. A repetitive thought is considered having a searching purpose if the thought 
reflects the person‘s looking for new ideas, attempting to generate options, and 
considering possibilities. A solving purpose entails improving certainty, increasing 
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predictability of outcomes, and finding solutions. Consequences of different purposes of 
repetitive thought seem to depend on the negativity of the thought. Segerstrom and 
colleagues (2003) found that among women who were at risk of developing breast 
cancer, those whose repetitive thought was less negative and was more of a searching 
purpose tended to have better overall mental health. However, when individuals reported 
more negative and more searching repetitive thoughts, they also reported more depressive 
symptoms. 
Depressive Rumination 
One type of unconstructive repetitive thought that has been widely studied is 
depressive rumination. Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) defined depressive rumination as 
perseverative thinking about one‘s depressive symptoms, their causes, meaning, and 
consequences. Depressive rumination does not lead individuals to take a more active 
approach to solve their problems (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
Based on Watkins‘ framework of repetitive thought characteristics, depressive rumination 
appears to possess several characteristics associated with unconstructive consequences.  
First, in terms of content valence, depressive rumination is negative because it 
focuses on one‘s sadness and its causes and consequences. Second, with regard to 
intrapersonal context, depressive rumination is likely to be concurrent with some other 
negative attributes or constructs that are also related to depression, such as low self-
esteem, self-criticism, and neediness (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007; Spasojevic & Alloy, 
2001). It is also likely that situational context in which individuals ruminate about their 
sadness is negative, such as a stressful period of life. Indeed, individuals tend to report 
more depressive rumination when they perceive their situations as stressful, and there is 
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evidence indicating that high levels of stress and high levels of depressive rumination 
result in worse social dysfunction, such as perceiving oneself as less able to complete 
tasks or less able to enjoy typical daily activities (Morrison & O‘Connor, 2004).  
The third characteristic of depressive rumination in Watkins‘s (2008) framework 
is construal level. Depressive rumination may be either low or high in terms of construal 
level. Individuals may pay attention to particular depressive symptoms, or they may try to 
find out why they experience sadness. In sum, the characteristics of depressive 
rumination in Watkins‘s (2008) framework are that it has negative content, tends to be 
related to negative intrapersonal and situational contexts, and is possibly of high 
construal level. The implication is that depressive rumination is associated with 
unconstructive consequences. 
It also seems implicit in theorizing that depressive rumination is done from the 
first-person perspective. Indeed, as it becomes clear below, depressive rumination 
measures are worded in the first-person perspective; for instance, ―Think ‗Why can‘t I 
handle things better‘‖ (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). As previously mentioned, 
Kross and colleagues (2005) found that when abstract repetitive thought is processed 
from the first-person perspective, it is associated with more negative affect. Therefore, 
depressive rumination is likely to be maladaptive. Lastly, with respect to purpose, 
Segerstrom and colleagues (2003) found that depressive rumination involves more 
searching rather problem-solving. As previously mentioned, searching is not harmful in 
itself, but its combination with negative valence, which is a basic characteristic of 
depressive rumination, has been associated with maladaptive consequences.   
Response Styles Theory  
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The most influential theory on rumination is the Response Styles Theory (RST) 
proposed by Nolen-Hoeksema (1991). Research on the Response Styles Theory has 
focused on identifying individual differences in engaging in depressive rumination. 
According the Response Styles Theory, when individuals engage in rumination when 
they feel sad or depressed, rumination will in turn prolong and exacerbate their depressed 
mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). To assess rumination, 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) developed a self-report measure called the 
Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ). Individuals‘ tendency to engage in depressive 
rumination is measured with the subscale called the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS), 
which consists of 22 items. Examples of the RRS items include ―I think back to other 
times I have been depressed,‖ ―I think about how hard it is to concentrate,‖ and ―I go 
away by myself and think about why I feel this way.‖ Respondents rate how frequently 
they experience each response, and a total depressive rumination score is derived.  
Other Types of Rumination 
It should be noted that there are other types of rumination that are not necessarily 
defined in relation to depressed mood. The three other types of rumination considered 
here are goal-directed rumination, ruminative self-focus, and stress-reactive rumination. 
Goal-related rumination is defined by Martin and Tesser (1996) as ―a class of conscious 
thoughts that revolve around a common instrumental theme and that recur in the absence 
of immediate environmental demands requiring the thoughts‖ (p. 1). According to Martin 
and Tesser (1996), individuals are expected to ruminate when they have not yet attained 
their goals or made sufficient progress towards their goals, and these ruminative thoughts 
can assume several forms, such as worry, regret, and anticipation. Martin, Tesser, and 
 7 
McIntosh (1993) developed an individual difference measure of this goal-related 
rumination which includes items such as ―When I have a problem, I tend to think about it 
a lot of the time‖ and ―I often think about the future.‖ Martin and Tesser (1996) argued 
that goal-related rumination is potentially beneficial because it may help individuals keep 
track of their progress towards their goals. Watkins (2008) suggested that the 
consequences of this goal-related rumination can be constructive or unconstructive 
depending on whether the ruminative thoughts facilitate or interfere with individuals‘ 
progress toward the goals that prompt these ruminative thoughts. In any case, goal-
directed rumination seems distinct from depressive rumination.  
Another type of rumination is identified in terms of its association with 
personality aspects, in particular neuroticism. Ruminative self-focus is defined by 
Trapnell and Campbell (1999) as self-focus that is driven by individuals‘ perception of 
threats, losses, or injustices to them. This ruminative self-focus is distinguished from self-
focus that is driven by intellectual curiosity and philosophical interest, which is labeled as 
reflection (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Ruminative self-focus is measured with items 
such as ―I tend to ‗ruminate‘ or dwell over things that happen to me for a really long time 
afterward,‖ ―I often find myself reevaluating something I‘ve done‖ and ―Sometimes it is 
hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself.‖ Although Trapnell and Campbell‘s (1999) 
definition of ruminative self-focus is not directly associated with depressed mood, their 
rumination measure is nonetheless positively correlated with depressive symptoms as 
well as other negative characteristics or states, such as neuroticism and negative affect. 
Thus, even though the items are not explicitly negative and inherently associated with 
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depressed mood, ruminative self-focus and depressive rumination may substantially 
overlap rather than be distinct from each other.  
Another type of rumination is stress-reactive rumination defined by Robinson and 
Alloy (2003) as individuals‘ tendencies to focus on maladaptive thoughts about 
themselves after encountering a stressful life event. This tendency can be assessed with 
the Stress-Reactive Rumination Scale (SRRS; Robinson, 1997) that includes items such 
as ―Think about how the stressful event was all your fault,‖ ―Think about what the 
occurrence of the stressor means about you,‖ and ―Think about how things like this 
always happen to you.‖ Whereas Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) proposed that depressive 
rumination occurs in response to depressed mood and can worsen depressed mood, 
stress-reactive rumination was proposed as following a stressful life event and as not 
necessarily inducing sadness. Nonetheless, both depressive rumination and stress-reactive 
rumination seem to convey a sense of self-blame and a perception of being subjected to 
unpleasant situations that others do not experience. Consider, for instance, the RRS items 
―Think ‗What am I doing to deserve this?‖ and ―Think ‗Why do I have problems other 
people don‘t have?‖ It was found that individuals who scored high on stress-reactive 
rumination and had high cognitive risk for depression (e.g., demonstrating pessimistic 
attributional styles and reporting more dysfunctional beliefs) were likely to suffer from 
more depressive symptoms more frequently and for a longer duration even after 
controlling for initial depressive symptoms and cognitive risk factors (Robinson & Alloy, 
2003). Similar analyses showed that depressive rumination did not interact with cognitive 
risk factors in predicting depressive symptoms (Robinson & Alloy, 2003). However, the 
authors did not include both stress-reactive rumination and depressive rumination in the 
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same analyses; therefore, it is inconclusive whether stress-reactive rumination would still 
interact with risk for depression in predicting depressive symptoms when depressive 
rumination is controlled for.  
Depressive Rumination and Dysphoria  
In this thesis, individuals are considered to experience dysphoria when they have 
higher scores on measures of depressive symptoms, whether or not these scores are 
indicative of clinical depression. Dysphoria is explicitly defined here so as to avoid any 
confusion because dysphoria has been conceptualized rather imprecisely and 
inconsistently in research (Starcevic, 2007).  
Research has shown that individuals who engage in depressive rumination report 
more dysphoria. Thomsen (2006) reviewed 100 experimental, cross-sectional, and 
longitudinal studies on rumination and dysphoria. Experimental studies tend to have a 
repeated-measures design, in which half of the participants were already sad or depressed 
or would be induced to feel sad, and the other half would be a control sample. Then 
participants would be induced to either ruminate (e.g., think about certain aspects of 
themselves or their depressive symptoms) or engage in some distracting thought, such as 
thinking of Mona Lisa‘s smile (Thomsen, 2006). The findings from experimental studies 
have shown that individuals who were induced to ruminate showed an increase in sad 
mood in comparison to those who were distracted. This effect of rumination on mood is 
contingent on individuals already feeling sad (Thomsen, 2006).  
Findings from cross-sectional studies also support the positive association 
between rumination and dysphoria. Cross-sectional studies tend to have either one of the 
following designs: (a) examining correlations between rumination and dysphoria in non-
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clinical samples, or (b) comparing the relation between rumination and dysphoria 
between groups. For instance, individuals are divided into depressed and non-depressed 
groups, and their depressive rumination scores are compared. Another type of group 
comparison is conducted by identifying high ruminators and low ruminators, and 
comparing their depressive symptomatology (Thomsen, 2006). The findings from cross-
sectional studies indicate that generally there is a positive association between rumination 
and dysphoria in both young and adult non-clinical samples (Rood, Roelofs, Bogels, 
Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schouten, 2009; Thomsen, 2006). However, compared to that of 
adult non-clinical samples, the association between depressive rumination and depressive 
symptoms may not be as strong in child samples and adult clinical samples (Thomsen, 
2006).  
The findings from longitudinal studies are not as clear as those from experimental 
and cross-sectional studies. For longitudinal studies, researchers typically measure 
individuals‘ initial levels of rumination and depressive symptoms, and measure these 
again after some time interval. Thomsen (2006) found that individuals who ruminate 
more subsequently experienced either the same or more depressive symptoms. The 
findings which indicated that rumination levels did not associate with more depression 
tended to be for studies with clinical samples, in particular in those in which participants 
received treatment. Thomsen (2006) suggested that more severe depression and treatment 
might be factors that make rumination become a less reliable predictor of depressive 
symptoms. In longitudinal studies with children and adolescent non-clinical samples, 
rumination was found to only modestly predict depressive symptoms when controlling 
for baseline levels of depression (Rood et al., 2009). Furthermore, due to the instability of 
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the effect sizes found, Rood and colleagues (2009) suggested that these findings should 
be interpreted with caution. 
Limitations in Previous Studies on Depressive Rumination and Dysphoria 
In general, depressive rumination is associated with dysphoria. However, due to 
limitations in studies examining the relation between depressive rumination and 
dysphoria one cannot state that it is depressive rumination that leads to worsening of 
dysphoria. According to Nolen-Hoeksema‘s (1991) Response Styles Theory, a 
ruminative response leads to prolonged depressed mood. Given this theory, a longitudinal 
design is most suitable to test the effects of depressive rumination. Several longitudinal 
studies have been conducted, but they have some limitations which render their findings 
inconclusive. First, individuals‘ depressive symptoms at Time 1 (T1) should be taken into 
account when examining the relation between T1 depressive rumination effects on T2 
depressive symptoms. Depression has been shown to remain relatively stable over time 
(Charman, 1994; Holsen, Kraft, & Vitterso, 2000; Lovibond, 1998); therefore, without 
controlling for its levels at T1, it is not possible to conclude whether the depressive 
symptoms at T2 results from T1 depressive rumination or whether symptoms simply are 
stable over time. However, baseline depression has not always been taken into account. 
For example, Broderick and Korteland (2004) did not control for initial depressive 
symptoms when examining whether adolescents‘ T1 depressive rumination predicted 
their T2 depressive symptoms.  
 Another limitation is to not take into account the influence of T2 depressive 
rumination on T2 dysphoria. Depressive rumination appears to be relatively stable over 
time (Bagby, Rector, Bacchiochi, & McBride, 2004), and cross-sectionally it is positively 
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correlated with depressive symptoms (Rood et al., 2009; Thomsen, 2006). Thus, by not 
controlling for T2 depressive rumination, it is not possible to conclude that T1 depressive 
rumination predicts T2 depressive symptoms, because the latter may simply be predicted 
by T2 depressive rumination. Once T2 depressive rumination is taken into account, it 
becomes less likely on statistical grounds that there would be a relation between T1 
depressive rumination and T2 depressive symptoms. Several studies have omitted to take 
T2 depressive rumination into account, so their findings remain inconclusive with regard 
to the influence of depressive rumination on dysphoria (Abela, Brozina & Haigh, 2002; 
Abela, Aydin, & Auerbach, 2007; Bagby, Rector, Segal, Joffe, Levitt, Kennedy, & 
Levitan, 1999; Broderick & Korteland, 2004; Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Kuehner 
& Weber, 1999; Schwartz & Koenig, 1996).  
The study by Arnow, Spangler, Klein, and Burns (2004) is an example of a 
longitudinal study on depressive rumination and depression that took into account both 
T1 depression and T2 depressive rumination. Arnow and colleagues (2004) examined the 
relation between depressive rumination and depression in chronically depressed 
individuals who underwent treatment over a period of 12 weeks. In their model, 
pretreatment depression and pretreatment depressive rumination were predictive of post-
treatment depression and post-treatment depressive rumination, respectively. Depression 
and depressive rumination were covariates at each assessment. Arnow and colleagues 
(2004) found that pretreatment depressive rumination did not have a causal relation with 
post-treatment depression; nor didpretreatment depression and post-treatment depressive 
rumination.  
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Besides controlling for T1 dysphoria and T2 depressive rumination, neuroticism 
is a crucial construct that should be taken into account when investigating the relation 
between depressive rumination and dysphoria. Neuroticism is individuals‘ persisting 
propensity to experience negative emotions, such as anxiety, anger, guilt and sadness 
(Widiger, 2009). Neuroticism is genetically determined, with genetics explaining 40-60% 
of the variance (Widiger, 2009), and neuroticism remains relatively stable with a 
tendency to decline slightly in adulthood over time (Roberts, Walton, & Viechbauer, 
2006). Neuroticism is related to both depressive rumination and dysphoria. Individuals 
who are high in neuroticism are vulnerable to experiencing depressive symptoms or 
suffering from depression in a relatively frequent, chronic and severe fashion (Duggan, 
Sham, Lee, Minne, & Murray, 1995; Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005; 
Saklofske, Kelly, & Jessen, 1995). They also engage in more depressive rumination 
(Muris et al., 2005; Nolan, Roberts, & Gotlib, 1998). More generally, neuroticism is a 
core personality construct that influences a very wide range of outcomes.  
Some research findings further suggest that rumination may mediate the relation 
between neuroticism and dysphoria. In their model, Nolan, Roberts, and Gotlib (1998) 
found that neuroticism did not predict T2 depressive symptoms directly, but it did 
indirectly via T1 depressive rumination. It should be noted that in this study, depressive 
rumination was only measured at T1, so T2 depressive rumination was not taken into 
account. Muris and colleagues (2005) also found that even the cross-sectional relation 
between neuroticism and depressive symptoms disappeared when controlling for 
rumination and worry. However, Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Arntz, and van Os (2008) 
found that in a clinical sample, even when rumination was taken into account as a 
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mediator, neuroticism was still positively related to depressive symptoms. Given these 
relations between neuroticism, depressive rumination, and dysphoria, it is necessary to 
control for neuroticism when examining the relation between depressive rumination and 
dysphoria.  
Another construct that should be taken into account when examining the relation 
between depressive rumination and depressive symptoms is control beliefs. Control 
beliefs refer to individuals having a sense of control in life as opposed to regarding life 
circumstances in a fatalistic manner (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978). Individuals who believe 
that they have less control over their lives are likely to experience more dysphoria 
(Marshall & Lang, 1990; Jang, Haley, Small, & Mortimer, 2000), and they also report 
engaging in more depressive rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 2001; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999).  
Some researchers may argue that taking control beliefs into account when 
investigating the association between depressive rumination and dysphoria is unnecessary 
due to its overlap with neuroticism. According to Judge, Erez, Bono, and Thoresen 
(2002), control beliefs and neuroticism (as well as self-esteem and generalized self-
efficacy) measures may be targeting the same higher-order construct. Taking either 
neuroticism or control beliefs into consideration when examining the relation between 
depressive rumination and dysphoria would be sufficient if neuroticism and beliefs in 
lack of control were basically the same. However, Judge and colleagues (2002) added 
that neuroticism, control beliefs, self-esteem, and generalized self-efficacy had some 
unique variance. Furthermore, their findings suggest that control beliefs have weaker 
associations with the other constructs than the relations among the remaining constructs. 
 15 
This may suggest that although there is an overlap between neuroticism and control 
beliefs, they have their own unique variance and are not similar enough to be considered 
the same construct. Consequently, both neuroticism andcontrol beliefs should be taken 
into account when examining the relation between depressive rumination and dysphoria.  
Some demographic information, such as age and gender, should also be taken into 
account when examining the relation between depressive rumination and dysphoria. 
There are age and gender differences in dysphoria. For instance, research suggests that 
older individuals tend to experience less depressive symptoms (Jorm, 2000). In terms of 
gender, women have also been found to suffer from depression more than men do 
(Piccinelli & Wilkinson, 2000; Weissman, Bland, Joyce, Newman, Wells, & Wittchen, 
1993), and also report more depressive rumination (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994). 
Positive Perception of Depressive Rumination  
Despite its relation to depressive symptoms, depressive rumination may be 
perceived by individuals as beneficial. Papageorgiou and Wells (2001a) conducted a 
study with a small sample of individuals who met the criteria of recurrent major 
depressive disorder. They found that all participants reported both advantages and 
disadvantages of rumination, with the advantages representing their perception of 
rumination as a strategy to understand and cope with their depression. These findings are 
consistent with those of Watkins and Baracaia (2001), who interviewed self-identified 
ruminators who were found to be highly ruminative and moderately dysphoric. Most 
participants identified at least one benefit of rumination. Examples of the benefits of 
rumination they identified included gaining insight or understanding, solving problems, 
and learning from past mistakes (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). There was also a positive 
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correlation between positive beliefs about rumination and proneness to depressive 
rumination, such that individuals who believed in the advantages of rumination were 
more likely to ruminate (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001b; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001).  
The need to gain insight may be a crucial reason why individuals ruminate. 
Findings from a study by Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993, Study 3) 
demonstrated that individuals with more depressive symptoms perceived themselves as 
less insightful than those with less depressive symptoms. Individuals who were asked to 
focus on their emotions, their physical sensations or symptoms, and themselves (e.g., ―the 
kind of person you are‖ and ―why do you react the way you do‖) reported higher 
perceived insightfulness than those who engaged in some distraction(Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, Study 4). This effect emerged regardless of whether individuals 
were dysphoric or not. Combining these findings together, it can be argued that 
individuals who are dysphoric may perceive themselves as particularly less insightful and 
may consequently ruminate so as to gain some insight into their own feelings.   
Depressive rumination may also be perceived as positive because it helps 
individuals avoid or experience less distress. Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, and Lyubomirsky 
(2008) argued that what reinforces individuals‘ engagement in rumination is a decrease in 
distress resulting from their withdrawal from aversive situations, because rumination 
arguably leads individuals to feel certain about their inability to overcome the situation 
and feel justified to take no action in the situation, or to leave the aversive situation. 
There is some evidence indicating that depressive rumination is associated with 
avoidance. Moulds, Kandris, Starr, and Wong (2007) examined different types of 
avoidance. The 4 types of avoidance included in this study were behavioral-social (e.g., 
 17 
desire to leave social situation), behavioral-nonsocial (e.g., avoid overly challenging 
activities), cognitive-social (e.g., fail to address the tension in interpersonal 
relationships), and cognitive-nonsocial (e.g., avoid deciding what to do with one‘s 
future). They found that depressive rumination was associated with behavioral-social 
avoidance. It should be noted that only anxiety symptoms,and not depressive symptoms, 
were controlled forin the analyses because avoidance typically is a characteristic of 
anxiety states. Therefore, it is inconclusive whether such an association between 
depressive rumination and behavioral-social avoidance is present if depressive symptoms 
are taken into account. Furthermore, it should also be noted that this relation was 
correlational in nature, and it cannot be conclude that depressive rumination leads to 
more behavioral-nonsocial avoidance or vice versa.  
Stability of Depressive Rumination 
The above perceived advantages of depressive rumination may partly explain why 
certain individuals are inclined to engage in such rumination whenever they feel sad or 
depressed. As mentioned above, there is evidence indicating that individuals‘ tendency to 
engage in depressive rumination is relatively stable over time. Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Morrow, and Fredrickson (1993) asked participants in one study to keep records of their 
mood over a 30-day period. They found that the majority of participants in their study 
were relatively consistent in how they reacted to dysphoria, such that some individuals 
tended to ruminate whenever they felt sad. In a 6-month longitudinal study in which 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, and Larson (1994) followed adults who had recently lost a 
family member, it was found that individuals‘ initial depressive rumination was strongly 
correlated with their depressive rumination at the 6-month follow-up. In another study 
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mentioned above, Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues (1999) found that in an adult 
community sample, individuals‘ initial depressive rumination scores strongly positively 
correlated with their depressive rumination scores measured one year later.  
Research findings also suggest that even with effective treatment, individual 
differences in rumination remain stable, at least in terms of relative ranking (i.e., who 
ruminates more than their peers). In a study with a clinical sample of outpatients 
diagnosed with major depressive disorder, Bagby, Rector, Bacchiochi, and McBride 
(2004) assessed participants‘ levels of depressive rumination and depression before and 
after a pharmacological treatment of 20-week average duration. Participants who 
experienced a substantial reduction in depression severity that lasted for at least 6 weeks 
were considered remitted.For the remitted group, depression severity reduced 
substantially after treatment, and their depressive rumination showed a clinically 
significant reduction post-treatment. The correlation between pre- and post-treatment 
depressive rumination was significant. That is, in terms of ranking, individual difference 
in depressive rumination were stable.In a previously mentioned study by Arnow and 
colleagues (2004) in a sample of individuals with major depression, pre-treatment 
depressive rumination scores were moderately correlated with depressive rumination 
after a 12-week treatment. In sum, depressive rumination has been shown to correlate 
with itself over time.  
Mechanisms of Depressive Rumination  
There are several mechanisms of depressive rumination that are proposed to play 
a role in the exacerbation of dysphoria. These mechanisms are negative thinking, poor 
problem solving, interference with instrumental behaviors, and a decrease in social 
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support (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). First of all, depressive 
rumination appears to lead dysphoric individuals to engage in more negative thinking 
about themselves and their situations in the past, present and future. In various 
experimental studies, a rumination manipulation in individuals who were sad or 
dysphoric led them to express more negative thoughts (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, 
& Berg, 1999), perceive themselves as more worthless and incompetent (Rimes & 
Watkins, 2005), recall more negative memories and perceive negative events as 
happening to them relatively frequently (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998), and expect more 
negative future events (Lavender & Watkins, 2004). Individuals who were induced to 
ruminate were also more likely to interpret a situation in a depressive and distorted 
manner. For instance, in a study by Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995), it was 
found that when asked to imagine losing an election, ruminating dysphoric individuals 
were more inclined to feel bad and think that they have lost by a landslide and less likely 
to shrug it off and think that they have done their best. Moreover, they were more likely 
to blame themselves, perceive the situation as unchangeable, and regard negative events 
as having an impact on various aspects of their lives. In contrast, dysphoric individuals 
who engaged in distraction and non-dysphoric individuals tend to explain negative 
situations in a less pessimistic fashion. Note that the rumination manipulation used in 
these experimental studies did not specifically ask individuals to think about their 
depressive symptoms. It was presumed that sad or dysphoric individuals would think 
about their symptoms when asked to focus on themselves and their feelings. Furthermore, 
many studies did not take into account an increase in sad feelings post-manipulation; 
 20 
therefore, it is not possible to conclude that negative thinking results from rumination and 
not from acute sadness.  
 Another mechanism through which depressive rumination may impact on 
dysphoria is lowered problem-solving abilities. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1995) studied the effects of rumination on individuals‘ problem-solving in hypothetical 
social situations. They found that dysphoric individuals who were led to ruminate 
provided less effective solutions than dysphoric individuals who engaged in distraction 
and individuals who were not dysphoric.Other researchers also found relatively similar 
detrimental effect of rumination on problem solving in dysphoric individuals, and this 
effect persisted even when the change of mood was accounted for (Donaldson & Lam, 
2004). However, ruminating about oneself and one‘s symptoms may not be enough to 
affect one‘s problem solving abilities. Watkins and Moulds (2005) found that it was only 
when depressed individuals ruminated in a more analytical way (e.g., think about the 
causes, meanings, and consequences of their feelings) that they showed poor problem 
solving. However, depressed individuals who ruminated in a more concrete manner (e.g., 
focus on the experience of their feelings) did not show poor problem solving. One 
possible explanation as to why rumination appears to negatively affect problem solving 
abilities is its association with problem perception. It has been found that dysphoric 
individuals who were induced to ruminate were likely to perceive their problems as more 
serious and unsolvable (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). Furthermore, even when these 
individuals could come up with solutions, they were unlikely to implement these 
solutions to resolve their problems (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999).  
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 Interference with instrumental behaviors is another mechanism through which 
depressive rumination prolongs depressed mood. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1993) found that dysphoric individuals who were induced to ruminate about themselves, 
their physical symptoms, and their emotions did not differ from dysphoric individuals 
and those who were not dysphoric regarding their perception of pleasant activities. 
Dysphoric individuals who engaged in rumination still perceive pleasant activities as 
enjoyable. However, ruminating dysphoric individuals were less likely to anticipate 
engaging in those activities. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) conducted a 
correlational study in another sample, and they found that without being induced to 
ruminate about their emotion, their symptoms, and themselves, dysphoric individuals did 
not differ from non-dysphoric individuals in terms of their judgment of the utility of 
pleasant activities and their likelihood to engage in such activities. Lyubomirsky and 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) concluded that the unwillingness to engage in pleasant activities 
that could improve individuals‘ mood resulted from rumination, not solely from 
dysphoria. Other research suggests that the inhibitive effect of rumination on instrumental 
behavior can have serious negative consequences. Lyubomirsky, Kasri, Chang, and 
Chung (2006) found that, when asked to read a vignette about discovering a breast lump 
and imagine that they were experiencing it themselves, female ruminators reported being 
less likely to contact doctors immediately than female non-ruminators even when both 
groups showed similar positive and negative ratings for their affect upon discovering the 
symptom. Furthermore, in their retrospective study, breast cancer survivors who were 
ruminators reported presenting their cancer symptoms to a healthcare professional 
significantly later than the non-ruminators even when both ruminators and non-
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ruminators reported similar feelings upon their discovery of breast cancer symptoms 
(e.g., a breast lump, nipple change, and nipple discharge). This suggests that rumination, 
not negative affect, inhibits individuals‘ instrumental behaviors, although the effect was 
also partially moderated by individuals‘ recalled positive affect at the time they 
discovered the symptom. Ruminators who reported more positive feelings did not wait as 
long as ruminators who reported low positive affect to see a healthcare professional 
(Lyubomirsky et al., 2006). Based on these findings, it is proposed that the impact of 
rumination on problem solving and instrumental behaviors may help maintain or worsen 
depressive symptoms in individuals.   
The last mechanism through which depressive rumination influences dysphoria is 
via its impact on interpersonal relationships. Depressive rumination is proposed to reduce 
social support and cause problems in relationships. Nolen-Hoeksema and Davis (1999) 
studied the effects of rumination on social support in a sample of individuals who lost 
their loved one. Highly ruminative participants reported seeking social support 
consistently more than those who were low ruminators over a period of 18 months, even 
after taking depressive symptoms into account. However, high ruminators reported 
receiving less social support, perceiving more friction and feeling more isolated from 
those who provided them with support even after controlling for their concurrent distress. 
In another study with students in the seventh grade, higher rumination is correlated with 
less perceived social support, although it should be noted that depressive symptoms were 
not controlled for(Abela, Vanderbilt, & Rochon, 2004).  
Other researchers also reported that besides perceiving that they receive less 
support from others, ruminators also report more interpersonal distress. Lam, Schuck, 
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Smith, Farmer, and Checkley (2003) found that ruminative depressed outpatients reported 
more distress from interpersonal relationships than their non-ruminative counterparts. 
Depressive rumination and depression significantly predicted individuals‘ overall 
interpersonal problems even when engagement in distracting activities and gender were 
taken into account. In sum, these findings support the proposition that depressive 
rumination negatively affects interpersonal relationships and lead to the reduction of 
social support, which may maintain or exacerbate individuals‘ dysphoria.  
Subtypes of Depressive Rumination  
One way to clarify the consequences of depressive rumination is to examine 
specific aspects of depressive rumination. More recent studies on rumination have found 
two different facets of depressive rumination, with one facet potentially being less 
harmful than the other (Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003). The dimension considered less harmful, or sometimes even potentially 
adaptive, involves reflecting upon one‘s feelings and circumstances in order to 
understand or overcome one‘s sadness. The supposedly more detrimental dimension of 
rumination includes self-criticism, regret, and helplessness (Roberts et al., 1998; Treynor 
et al., 2003). In a study by Roberts and colleagues (1998) using the Ruminative Response 
Scale of the Response Styles Questionnaire (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), 
they found three factors of depressive rumination: symptom-based rumination, 
introspection/self-isolation, and self-blame. The symptom-based rumination factor 
included items that may overlap with measures of depressive symptoms, such as ―Think 
about your feelings of fatigue and achiness‖ and ―Think about how hard it is to 
concentrate.‖ The other two factors do not seem to overlap with depressive symptoms 
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and may be more properly considered as measuring rumination. The introspection/self-
isolation factor consisted of items representing an attempt to reflect upon one‘s feelings 
such as ―Isolate yourself and think about the reasons why you feel sad‖ and ―Write down 
what you are thinking about and analyze it.‖ The last factor was labeled self-blame, and it 
included items such as ―Think ‗Why do I always react this way?‘‖ and ―Think about how 
angry you are with yourself‖ (Roberts et al., 1998). Both introspection/self-isolation and 
self-blame factors were positively associated with current and worst lifetime depressive 
symptoms and were also positively correlated with neuroticism, a personality factor 
related to negative emotions and depression. Self-blame demonstrated a stronger 
relationship with neuroticism than introspection/isolation (Roberts et al., 1998), and so 
seems a more detrimental subtype of rumination. 
The RRS: Reflective Pondering and Brooding  
Nolen-Hoeksema, along with her colleagues, has identified subtypes of depressive 
rumination for the scale that she had developed. Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-
Hoeksema (2003) removed some of the RRS items which they deemed to be relatively 
similar to items of the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961), which assesses individuals‘ depressive symptoms. From the remaining 
RRS items, Treynor and colleagues (2003) identified two subtypes of depressive 
rumination, which they labeled as reflective pondering and brooding. Relatively similar 
to the findings from Roberts and colleagues (1998), reflective pondering included items 
such as ―Go someplace alone to think about your feelings‖ and ―Analyze recent events to 
try to understand why you are depressed.‖ The brooding factor consisted of items such as 
―Think ‗What am I doing to deserve this?‘‖ and ―Think ‗Why do I have problems other 
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people don‘t have?‘‖ Reflection, brooding, and dysphoria were positively correlated with 
one another cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Based on zero-order correlations, 
compared to reflection, brooding was more strongly associated with dysphoria cross-
sectionally and longitudinally. Note that with these were zero-order correlations, when 
analyzing the relation between one subtype of rumination and dysphoria, the other 
subtype of rumination is not controlled for. Furthermore, when examining the 
correlations between T2depressive rumination and T2 dysphoria, the initial levels of 
depressive rumination and dysphoria were not controlled for.  
Treynor and colleagues (2003) also used structural equation modeling to examine 
the relations between reflection, brooding, and dysphoria over a one-year period. They 
found that each variable at the later time point was best predicted by its initial score, after 
controlling for initial scores of the other two variables. As well, individuals‘ T1 reflection 
did not predict their T2 brooding, and nor did T1 brooding predictT2 reflection. 
However, individuals who were more dysphoricat T1 were more likely to engage in both 
reflecting and brooding at T2, even when T1 reflection, T1 brooding and T2 dysphoria 
were controlled for. Furthermore, individuals who engaged in T1 brooding were likely to 
become more dysphoric at T2, whereas those who reflected at T1 were slightly less likely 
to be dysphoric at T2. The findings thus suggest that compared to reflection, brooding has 
a stronger association with dysphoria. However, the findings from the structural equation 
modeling should be interpreted with caution because the model did not show a very good 
fit to the data, with the chi-square being significant. Nonetheless, other indices 
demonstrated a good fit (Treynor et al., 2003).  
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 Some cross-sectional findings also support the differential effects of reflection 
and brooding. Burwell and Shirk (2007) studied reflection and brooding in an adolescent 
sample. A battery of questionnaires, including measures of depressive symptoms, 
rumination, and stress, were completed by the adolescents or their mothers at three time 
points (T1, T2, and T3) over three academic semesters. However, adolescents‘ levels of 
rumination were only assessed at T2 with a modified version of the RRS. Two factors of 
depressive rumination emerged, which mostly overlapped with what had been previously 
found by Treynor and colleagues (2003). At T2, those who brooded had more depressive 
symptoms, as rated by the adolescents, adolescents‘ mothers and clinicians, whereas 
reflection was only correlated with clinician-rated depressive symptoms cross-
sectionally.  
Findings on rumination and cognitive biases also indicated that reflection and 
brooding are different. Participants in a study by Joorman, Dkane, and Gotlib (2006) 
performed a dot probe task, in which they identified the position of a dot which appeared 
after a pair of images showing different emotions. Controlling for concurrent depressive 
symptoms, they found a positive correlation between brooding and attentional bias for 
faces displaying sadness. In other words, individuals who engaged in more brooding were 
more likely to be attentive to sadness (Joorman et al., 2006). There was no association 
between individuals‘ tendency to engage in reflection and such a cognitive bias to 
sadness (Joorman et al., 2006).  
 Studies on depressive rumination subtypes and suicide also support the 
differences between reflection and brooding. Crane, Barnhofer, and Williams (2007) 
found that individuals with different past levels of suicidality showed different patterns of 
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engagement in depressive rumination. Individuals who had never had suicide ideation 
and never attempted suicide reported more reflection than brooding. Those who had 
suicidal ideation but never attempted suicide reported relatively equal tendencies to 
engage in reflection and brooding. Individuals with a history of suicide attempts (who 
presumably had had suicidal ideation) reported more brooding than reflection (Crane et 
al., 2007). O‘Connor and Noyce (2008) also studied the association between subtypes of 
depressive rumination and suicidal ideation. They found that brooding had a stronger 
association with suicidal ideation at the 3-month follow-up than did reflection. 
Furthermore, only brooding mediated the relation between self-criticism and suicidal 
ideation. These differences support the distinction between reflection and brooding, with 
brooding appearing to be more maladaptive than reflection.  
 However, reflection may not be completely innocuous. Surrence, Miranda, 
Marroquin, and Chan (2009) studied subtypes of depressive rumination in relation to 
suicidal ideation and suicide attempts. Overall, individuals who engaged in more 
brooding reported higher suicidal ideation, but there was no such correlation between 
reflection and suicidal ideation. However, for individuals who had attempted suicide in 
the past, the more they engaged in reflecting upon their sadness and circumstances, the 
more prone they were to having thoughts about committing suicide, and this effect 
emerged even after controlling for individuals‘ past suicide attempts, depressive 
symptoms, hopelessness, and brooding. However, the same proneness to suicidal ideation 
did not emerge in brooding individuals with a history of suicide attempts  (Surrence et al., 
2009). These findings thus suggest that reflection may not be completely harmless.  
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 It should be noted that the two subtypes of depressive rumination might not be 
consistently identified when using different samples. Whitmer and Gotlib (2011) 
conducted factor analyses of the RRS in 3 different groups of participants: never 
depressed individuals, formerly depressed individuals, and currently depressed 
individuals.In samples with never depressed individuals and formerly depressed 
individuals, reflection and brooding still emerged as subtypes of depressive rumination, 
although it should be noted that one reflection item (―Write down what you are thinking 
and analyze it‖) did not load on either reflection or brooding factors in sample of 
formerly depressed individuals. In currently depressed individuals, however, two 
reflection items loaded onto the same factor as the brooding items. Whitmer and Gotlib 
(2011) argued that the distinction between reflection and brooding is blurred in 
individuals who are currently suffering from depression. In currently depressed 
individuals, apart from the brooding factor, the other factor consisted of items indicating 
individuals‘ attempt to isolate themselves in order to engage in rumination. There was no 
reflection factor per se.  
Rumination on Sadness Scale  
 Another measure of depressive rumination is the Rumination on Sadness Scale 
(RSS) developed by Conway, Csank, Holm, and Blake (2000). The RSS is a 13-item self-
report questionnaire. It includes items such as ―I repeatedly analyze and keep thinking 
about the reasons for my sadness,‖ ―I have difficulty getting myself to stop thinking 
about how sad I am,‖ and ―I search my mind repeatedly for events or experiences in my 
childhood that may help me understand my sad feelings.‖  
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Conway and colleagues (2000) developed this measure of rumination on sadness 
in response to the presence of some validity issues that they had identified on the 
Ruminative Response Scale of the Response Styles Questionnaire (RRS; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Among the issues raised, one was the overlap between the 
RRS and the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980), which 
measures individuals‘ frequency of having negative automatic thoughts related to 
depression. Examples of items from the ATQ include ―I‘m no good‖ and ―What‘s wrong 
with me‖ (Hollon & Kendall, 1980), which are not very different from RRS items such as 
―Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes‖ and ―Think ‗Why can‘t I 
get going?‘‖ (Treynor et al., 2003). Although Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues (2008) 
later provided a distinction between rumination and automatic negative thought by 
indicating that rumination is defined in terms of process of thinking rather than the 
thought content, this distinction remains quite arbitrary.  
 The Rumination on Sadness Scale (RSS; Conway et al., 2000) was originally 
developed to assess one construct. The findings from the principle components analysis 
in the original study with a student sample demonstrated that all the scale items loaded 
onto one factor (Conway et al., 2000). When factor-analyzed with other repetitive 
thought scales, such as worry, posttraumatic stress, reflection, emotional processing, and 
other rumination scales (the RRS and the rumination scale of the RRQ), all RSS items 
loaded on only one factor (Segerstrom et al., 2003). Similarly, Siegle, Moore, and Thase 
(2004) found that the RSS items loaded onto one factor when they were factor-analyzed 
with items from other measures of rumination, posttraumatic stress, worry, emotional 
control (i.e., extent to which individuals inhibit undesired thoughts), and thought control 
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(i.e., ways of coping with intrusive thoughts). These findings supported the 
unidimensionality of rumination on sadness as measured by the RSS.  
However, it might be possible that depressive rumination as assessed by the RSS 
is composed of subtypes. Raes, Hermans, Williams, Bijittebier, and Eelen (2008, Study 
1) conducted confirmatory factor analyses on the RSS and found a 3-factor solution: 
causal analysis (ruminating about the reasons for sadness), understanding (ruminating 
about the meaning of sadness), and uncontrollability (having no control over one‘s 
ruminative thinking on sadness). They then removed some original RSS items and added 
some new items so as to improve the measure. They then replicated the 3-factor model in 
another sample (Raes et al., 2008, Study 2). However, there were some methodological 
flaws in the research. For instance, the method the authors used to test and change the 
structures of their confirmatory factor analysis in Study 1 was akin to a stepwise 
regression, and the changes they made were data-driven rather than theory-based. In 
Study 2, the omission of a chi-square test rendered the findings for the 3-factor model 
problematic, especially when considering the relatively small size (n = 152) of the sample 
used in the study. The findings from this paper should then be interpreted with caution. 
Roelofs, Muris, Huibers, Peeters, and Arntz(2006) also found that the RSS might have 
multiple factors. They identified 3 factors: rumination on causes of sadness, symptom-
based rumination, and rumination on sadness. However, they factor analyzed the RSS 
items in conjunction with the RRS items; therefore, it is not clear whether the RSS would 
consist of 3 factors if analyzed on its own (Roelofs et al., 2006).  
In more recent work, a confirmatory factor analysis with a large sample of 
respondents indicates that depressive rumination as assessed by the RSS consists of two 
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subtypes. In an attempt to investigate the components of rumination on sadness, Tabri, 
Conway, and Alfonsi (manuscript in preparation) conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis with a sample of 3,089 university students. Of the 13 RSS items, six items 
loaded onto two factors. The first factor included three items that indicated individuals‘ 
attempt to search for deeper meaning regarding their own sadness. The three items were 
―I repeatedly think about what sadness really is by concentrating on my feelings and 
trying to understand them,‖ ―I question and keep wondering about the meaning of life to 
find clues that may help me understand my sadness‖ and ―I get the feeling that if I think 
long enough about my sadness, I will find that it has some deeper meaning and that I will 
be able to understand myself better because of it.‖ This factor was labeled as meaning 
searching. The second factor consisted of three items reflecting individuals‘ repetitive 
and uncontrollable thoughts about their sadness, and it was thus labeled as repetitive 
thinking. The three items were ―I get absorbed about why I am sad and find it difficult to 
think about other things,‖ ―I have difficulty getting myself to stop thinking about how sad 
I am‖ and ―I repeatedly analyze and keep thinking about the reasons for my sadness.‖  
Further examination of meaning searching and repetitive thinking in relation to 
personality traits in a subsample of individuals who completed a personality inventory (n 
= 337) supported the differentiation between the two subtypes of depressive rumination. 
Individuals who engage in rumination to find meaning for their sadness scored higher on 
both neuroticism and openness to experience, whereas those who think repetitively about 
their sadness were likely to have high scores on neuroticism only (Tabri et al., manuscript 
in preparation). It should be noted that these distinctions between meaning searching and 
repetitive thinking on the basis of their relations to personality constructs correspond to 
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those between reflection and ruminative self-focus found by Trapnell and Campbell 
(1999). Using the RRQ, Trapnell and Campbell (1999) found that reflection was 
correlated with both neuroticism and openness to experience, whereas ruminative self-
focus was only associated with neuroticism. Although meaning searching and repetitive 
thinking as assessed with the RSS are characteristically different, both subtypes of 
depressive rumination were positively correlated with individuals‘ depressive symptoms 
in a subsample of individuals who completed a measure of depressive symptomatology (n 
= 1,098). In other words, individuals who engaged in either meaning searching or 
repetitive thinking were likely to experience more depressive symptoms (Tabri et al., 
manuscript in preparation).  
Present study  
Few studies have been conducted that have effectively examined the causal 
relation of depressive rumination on depressive symptoms. What is required is that both 
depressive rumination and depressive symptoms be assessed at each time point in a 
longitudinal design. Within that context, the impact of T1 rumination on T2 dysphoria 
can be examined, while taking into account T1 dysphoria and T2 depressive rumination. 
Prior longitudinal research has yielded mixed results, and has not always taken into 
account T1 depressive symptoms and T2 depressive rumination. Finally, to my 
knowledge, only one longitudinal study of proper design have been conducted making 
the distinction between more and less maladaptive forms of depressive rumination.  
The present study addressed this relative absence of well controlled longitudinal 
research. In the present study, the relations between meaning searching, repetitive 
thinking, and depressive symptoms were examined in a sample of recent retirees over a 
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period of two years. The study was part of a larger longitudinal study on retirement 
conducted at Concordia University. At the outset of the study, participants completed a 
packet of questionnaires including some demographic items such as age and gender, a 
measure of personality, and a measure of control beliefs. As stated earlier, neuroticism, 
control beliefs, age, and gender should be taken into account when examining the relation 
between depressive rumination and dysphoria. Therefore, these variables were controlled 
for in the current study. Participants completed the RSS and a measure of depressive 
symptomatology 3 times, with 1-year time intervals between T1 and T2, and between T2 
and T3.     
The main hypothesis in the present study was that only repetitive thinking, but not 
meaning searching, predicts depressive symptoms over time. This hypothesis was based 
on findings from previous research which showed that compared to reflective pondering, 
brooding was more strongly associated with depressive symptoms over time (Burwell & 
Shirk, 2007; Treynor et al., 2003). At face value, repetitive thinking, which reflects the 
uncontrollability of ruminative thinking, seems not as negative as brooding which 
includes the sense of regret and self-blame. However, in comparison to meaning 
searching, repetitive thinking still appears more negative and does not seem adaptive. 
Thus, only repetitive thinking was hypothesized to predict depressive symptoms over 
time.  
It should be noted that thispredicted longitudinal relationof repetitive thinking to 
depressive symptoms was proposed to emerge, even as each would predict itself at 
subsequent assessments, as would meaning searching. In other words, T1 meaning 
searching would predict T2 meaning searching, and T2 meaning searching would predict 
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T3 meaning searching. The same relations would emerge for repetitive thinking and 
depressive symptomatology, respectively. Furthermore, it was expected that meaning 
searching, repetitive thinking, and depressive symptoms would be positively correlated 
with each other cross-sectionally.  
Another hypothesis in the present study was that meaning searching and repetitive 
thinking predict each other over time. According to Ramel, Goldin, Carmona, and 
McQuaid (2004), a less maladaptive rumination subtype such as reflection may actually 
be an important first step that leads to individuals brooding and dwelling on their current 
state. The idea that the potentially adaptive subtype of depressive rumination and the 
more maladaptive subtype of depressive rumination are predictive of each other was also 
partially based on Papageorgiou and Wells‘s (2003) metacognitive model of rumination 
and depression. They proposed that positive beliefs about rumination (e.g., ―Ruminating 
about my depression helps me to understand past mistakes and failures‖) lead tomore 
rumination, which in turn leads to individuals‘ experience of negative beliefs about 
rumination that reflect the uncontrollability of ruminative thought and its negative social 
consequences (e.g., ―It is impossible not to ruminate about the bad things that have 
happened in the past‖ and ―Everyone would desert me if they knew how much I ruminate 
about myself‖). Note that positive beliefs about rumination appear to correspond to RSS 
meaning searching, and the perception of uncontrollability appears to correspond to RSS 
repetitive thinking. Just as Papageorgiou and Wells (2003) argue that positive beliefs 
would precede negative beliefs about depressive rumination, it is possible that meaning 
searching would precede repetitive thinking.  
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Additionally, in the present study, repetitive thinking was also proposed to predict 
subsequent meaning searching. It is possible that individuals who are quite stuck in the 
process of depressive rumination might try to explain or justify their own ruminative 
thinking, and they may try to convince themselves that they cannot stop ruminating 
because they have not yet found meaning for their experience of sadness. Empirical 
findings from previous studies partially support the latter hypothesis. It has been shown 
that reflective pondering, which is a potentially less maladaptive subtype of depressive 
rumination, is positively correlated with brooding, which is a more maladaptive subtype 
of rumination cross-sectionally (Schoofs, Hermans, & Raes, 2010; Surrence et al., 2009; 
Treynor et al., 2003) and longitudinally (Schoofs et al., 2010; Treynor et al., 2003). 
However, it should be noted that Treynor and colleagues (2003) found that T1 reflective 
pondering did not predict T2 brooding when controlling for individuals‘ T1 brooding and 
T1 depressive symptoms. Nor did T1 brooding predict T2 reflective pondering when T1 
reflective pondering and T1 depressive symptoms were taken into account.  
Method 
Participants  
 Participants were recruited through organizations for retirees and through 
advertisements in local newspapers. Data were collected from a sample of 433 
participants who had worked full-time for a minimum of 20 years and were not currently 
working morethan 10 hours a week. After excluding participants with missing data, there 
were 349 participants in total (181 women and 168 men; 80.60% of the original sample). 
There were no statistically significant differences between participants whose data were 
complete and those with missing data aside from the fact that those who completed the 
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study tended to be younger (M = 58.97, SD = 4.89) than those whose data were missing 
(M = 60.19, SD = 6.32; t(431) = 1.94, p = .05). Mean age of participants who were 
included in the study was 58.97 years, with a range of 44 to 77 years. Percentage by age 
range were 1.43% (50 years or younger), 23.50% (51-55 years), 41.55% (56-60 years), 
23.78% (61-65 years), 7.16% (66-70 years), and 2.58% (71 years or older). Participants‘ 
ethnicity was not assessed, but it was apparent to us that the vast majority of participants 
were of European ancestry.  
Materials  
The Rumination on Sadness Scale (RSS; Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 
2000). As mentioned above, the RSS is a 13-item self-report measure that was designed 
to assess individuals‘ levels of rumination when they are feeling sad (e.g., ―I have 
difficulty getting myself to stop thinking about how sad I am‖). Respondents rate the 
extent to which each item reflects their responses to sadness on a 5-point scale ranging 
from not al all (1) to very much (5). Score range is from 13 to 60. It has been 
demonstrated that the RSS has good internal consistency ( = .91) and test-retest 
reliability over the duration of 2-3 weeks (r = .70) (Conway et al., 2000). The RSS has 
also been shown convergent validity and discriminant validity with several related 
measures (Conway et al., 2000), and has been recommended as a measure of depressive 
rumination (Luminet, 2004). 
Based on recent findings (Tabri et al., manuscript in preparation), only 6 items 
included in the 2 subscales of RSS, Repetitive Thinking and Meaning Searching, were 
used in the current study.  Meaning searching and repetitive thinking total scores reported 
here varied from 3 to 15, with higher numbers corresponding to more rumination.  
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 The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 
1977). Depression was assessed with the CES-D, which is a 20-item self-report 
questionnaire developed for measuring depressive symptomatology in the general 
population. Respondents indicate the extent to which each item reflects how frequently 
they felt or behaved during the week prior to the assessment (e.g., ―I was bothered by 
things that usually don‘t bother me‖) on a 4-point scale. The response scale was as 
follows: 0 = Rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day), 1 = Some or a little of the time 
(1-2 days), 2 = Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days), and 3 = most 
or all of the time (5-7 days). Scores range from 0 to 60, with 16 as a cutoff score for 
depression. The CES-D puts a main focus on the affective component of depression 
rather than physical symptoms, which renders the CES-D suitable for assessing 
depressive symptomatology in older adults who tend to have some medical conditions. It 
has been found that the CES-D showed good accuracy for detecting depression in an 
older population in a primary care setting (Watson & Pignone, 2003).  
 It has been demonstrated that the CES-D has good internal consistency, with an 
alpha coefficient of .87 and .89 in cancer patients and healthy individuals, respectively 
(Hann, Winter, & Jacobsen, 1999). The CES-D has also been found to have moderate 
test-retest reliability over a period of 2.5 weeks (Hann et al., 1999).   
 The NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 
1992).Neuroticism was assessed with the NEO-FFI, which is a 60-item questionnaire 
designed to assess individuals‘ Big Five personality dimensions including neuroticism, 
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness to experience. NEO-FFI is a 
shortened version of therevised NEO Personality Inventory(NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 
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1992).Other personality dimensions besides neuroticism were not of interest in the 
present study. There are 12 neuroticism items, each of which is a self-descriptive 
statement (e.g., ―When I‘m under a great deal of stress, sometimes I feel like I‘m going to 
pieces‖). Respondents rate each statement in terms of its representativeness of their 
opinion on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). 
Higher total scores reflect more neuroticism. 
 Overall, the NEO-FFI has satisfactory psychometric properties. It has been shown 
that the 5 scales have adequate internal consistency ( = .73 to .87) in Canadian female 
university students (Holden & Fekken, 1994). Furthermore, all scales have been shown to 
have strong test-retest reliability across the duration of 30 months in an adult population 
(Murray, Rawlings, Allen, & Trinder, 2003).   
 Control Beliefs (CB; Pearlin & Schooler, 1978). Participants‘ perception of 
control in their lives was assessed with the CB, which is composed of 7 items. Each item 
is a statement reflecting a person‘s beliefs in control in life (e.g., ―I have little or no 
control over the things that happen to me‖). Respondents rate the extent to which they 
agree with each statement on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (4). The scale has been shown to have good internal consistency (Pearlin 
& Schooler, 1978) and moderate reliability over the period of 3 years (Pearlin, Liberman, 
Menaghan, & Mullan, 1981). Higher total scores reflect more perceived control. 
 Demographics Questionnaire.A demographics questionnaire contained items 
inquiring about participants‘ age, gender, educational level, occupation, marital status, 
spoken and written languages, and retirement. Of all the information, only age and gender 
were of interest in the present study.   
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Procedure   
 The present study was part of a larger longitudinal study on retirement conducted 
at Concordia University. Individuals interested in participating in the study contacted the 
laboratory. No more than 6 participants completed the questionnaires at any given 
session. At the first session, the experimenter asked participants to fill out a packet of 
questionnaires, which included the demographics questions, the personality measure 
(NEO-FFI), the measure of control beliefs, as well as other measures not relevant to the 
present study. A year later (Time 1), participants were asked to return in order to 
complete the rumination scale (RSS) and the depression scale (CES-D) as well as other 
measures which were not relevant to the present study. Participants were asked to return 
to complete the same questionnaires as Time 1 again after one year (Time 2) and two 
years (Time 3). Each participant was paid $50 per session.  
Results 
 Table I shows means and standard deviations and correlations between the 
variables. The average age of participants in the study was 58.97 years (range: 44 to 77 
years, SD = 4.89). The average score on neuroticism was 15.30 (SD = 7.71). The average 
score of the control beliefs measure was 23.24 (SD = 3.30). Meaning searching average 
scores were 5.24 (SD = 2.51), 5.16 (SD =2.58), and 4.88 (SD =2.36) at T1, T2, and T3, 
respectively. As mentioned above, these scores ranged from 3 to 15, and these indicated 
that the participants engaged in little meaning searching. As for repetitive thinking, the 
average scores at T1, T2, and T3 were 6.94 (SD =2.84), 6.56 (SD =2.76), and 6.43 (SD= 
2.75), indicating that participants engage in little repetitive thinking. In terms of 
depression scores, the average scores were 7.40 (SD = 7.23), 7.57 (SD = 7.49), and 7.64  
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations among All Measures in the Model  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Gender —      
2. Age  -.07 —     
3. Neuroticism  .18**   .00 —    
4. Control -.07  -.10 -.50*** —   
5. RSS_R 1 .20***  -.04  .47*** -.33*** —  
6. RSS_M 1  .13*  -.03  .42*** -.30*** .63*** — 
7. RSS_R 2 .21*** -.17**  .48*** -.28*** .62*** .54*** 
8. RSS_M 2  .13*  -.07  .41*** -.31*** .53*** .63*** 
9. RSS_R 3 .23***  -.12*  .45*** -.31*** .58*** .50*** 
10. RSS_M 3 .17**  -.08  .40*** -.29*** .47*** .58*** 
11. Dysphoria 1  .01   .12*  .49*** -.41*** .45*** .39*** 
12. Dysphoria 2  .05   .13*  .53*** -.46*** .41*** .36*** 
13. Dysphoria 3 .01   .06  .45*** -.42*** .39*** .33*** 
M 1.52 58.97 15.30 23.24 6.94 5.24 
SD   .50   4.89    7.71   3.30 2.84 2.51 
     —      —     .86     .81   .89    .86 
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Table I (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations among All Measures in the Model  
Measure 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Gender        
2. Age         
3. Neuroticism        
4. Control         
5. RSS_R 1        
6. RSS_M 1        
7. RSS_R 2 —       
8. RSS_M 2 .68*** —      
9. RSS_R 3 .66*** .53*** —     
10. RSS_M 3 .55*** .66*** .65*** —    
11. Dysphoria 1 .42*** .36*** .38*** .27*** —   
12. Dysphoria 2 .48*** .41*** .38*** .32*** .71*** —  
13. Dysphoria 3 .42*** .35*** .49*** .36*** .68*** .71*** — 
M 6.56 5.16 6.43 4.88 7.40 7.57 7.64 
SD 2.76 2.58 2.75 2.36 7.23 7.49 7.27 
   .89   .86   .89   .86   .88   .89   .87 
 
Note.For gender; Male is score 1 and Female is scored 2. Control = Control Beliefs; 
RSS_R = Rumination (Repetitive Thinking); RSS_M = Rumination (Meaning 
Searching). 1, 2, and 3 refer to Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.  
*p < .05; **p < .01; *** p <.001.  N = 349. For all measures, higher scores mean more of 
the construct. 
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(SD = 7.27) at T1, T2, and T3 respectively, indicating that approximately 12.51% of the 
participants scored at or above the cutoff of depression (score = 16).  
 As indicated in Table I, participants who were more dysphoric tended to be older, 
to have higher neuroticism scores, to be less likely to believe that they had control, to be 
more likely to try to search for meaning, and to think repetitively. Women and men did 
not differ in terms of their levels of dysphoria.  
Comparisons of Mean Scores of Rumination and Dysphoria across Time 1, Time 2, 
and Time 3 
 Paired t-tests were conducted to compare the means of meaning searching, 
repetitive thinking, and dysphoria over time (T1, T2, and T3). Individuals‘ meaning 
searching scores were stable from T1 (M = 5.24, SD = 2.51) to T2 (M = 5.16, SD = 2.58; 
t< 1), dropped significantly from T1 to T3 (M = 4.88, SD = 2.36; t(348) = 2.98, p <.01) 
and from T2 to T3 (t(348) = 2.56, p< .05). Repetitive thinking showed a significant drop 
from T1 (M = 6.94, SD = 2.84) to T2 (M = 6.56, SD = 2.76; t(348) = 2.90, p <.01), and 
from T1 to T3 (M = 6.43, SD = 2.75; t(348) = 3.69, p< .001). The difference between T2 
and T3 repetitive thinking was not statistically significant (t(348) = 1.03 p =.30). 
Participants‘ dysphoria scores remained stable across T1 (M = 7.40, SD = 7.23), T2 (M = 
7.57, SD = 7.49), and T3 (M = 7.64, SD = 7.27), ts<1.  
Meaning Searching, Repetitive Thinking, and Dysphoria 
 The hypotheses of the present study as paths in a model were tested by structural 
equation modeling (SEM; Kline, 2005). Preliminary analyses showed that there was a 
high level of multivariate kurtosis in the data (Normalized Mardia‘s coefficient was 
48.21). Upon examination of the kurtosis of each measure, it was found that dysphoria 
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scores at the 3 time points showed large kurtosis (5.81 at T1, 3.70 at T2, and 3.98 at T3). 
Using the cutoffs for kurtosis and skewness suggested by Kline (2005), none of the 
variables presented a serious problem to the analyses. However, because the multivariate 
kurtosis posed a problem, the maximum likelihood robust estimator was used in order to 
evaluate the path coefficients and to test their standard errors. The values used to assess 
the fit of the model included the Sattora-Bentler chi-square (S-Bχ²), the comparative fit 
index (CFI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and its 90% 
confidence interval (CI). To indicate a good fit, a model should have a nonsignificant S-
Bχ², a CFI close to 1.00, RMSEA less than or equal to .05, a 90% CI within the range of 
.00 to .08, and residuals less than .10.  
 The model proposed that when neuroticism, control beliefs, age, and genderwere 
controlled for, the main hypothesis was that repetitive thinking predicts dysphoria 
longitudinally. As such, there were paths from T1 repetitive thinking to T2 dysphoria, 
and from T2 repetitive thinking to T3 dysphoria. The second hypothesis was that 
meaning searching and repetitive thinking relate to each other over time, such that T1 
meaning searching predicts T2 repetitive thinking, and T1 repetitive thinking predicts T2 
meaning searching. Similarly, T2 meaning searching predicts T3 repetitive thinking, and 
T2 repetitive thinking predicts T3 meaning searching. Cross-sectionally, it was expected 
that meaning searching, repetitive thinking, and dysphoria would be positively correlated 
with one another. The model treated the two subtypes of depressive rumination and 
dysphoria as covariates at each time point.  
 The proposed model had a relatively good fit to the data (S-Bχ² (12) = 12.47, p = 
.41, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .01, CI = .00 – .06), with most of the proposed paths being 
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significant. However, one residual of .13, which was above the cutoff of .10, appeared 
between individuals‘ T1 depression and their T2 repetitive thinking. To improve to the fit 
of the model, the non-significant paths were removed and a path was added between T1 
dysphoria and T2 repetitive thinking. The final model demonstrated a good fit to the data 
(S-Bχ² (14) = 11.75, p = .63, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, CI = .00 – .04) with no 
residuals. All paths in the model were significant. See Figure 1.  
 Contrary to the initial hypothesis that repetitive thinking predicts dysphoria a year 
later, the final model indicated that dysphoria was a predictor of repetitive thinking over 
time. The model indicated that individuals who reported more dysphoria at T1 reported 
more repetitive thinking at T2 (β = .11, z = 2.60, p < .01). However, T2 dysphoria did not 
predict repetitive thinking at T3.  
As for the second hypothesis regarding the relation between meaning searching 
and repetitive thinking, the findings indicated that each subtype of depressive rumination 
predicted the other type of depressive rumination between T1 and T2, and between T2 
and T3, save for T2 meaning searching and T3 repetitive thinking.Individuals‘ T1 
meaning searching predicted their T2 repetitive thinking a year later (β = .15, z = 3.21, p 
< .01). T1 repetitive thinking also predicted T2 meaning searching (β = .19, z = 2.34, p < 
.05). In other words, individuals who tried to search for meaning of their sadness in the 
first year became likely to think about their sadness repetitively a year after. Furthermore, 
those who thought repetitively about their sad feelings would be inclined to search for 
meanings of their sadness after a year. However, between T2 and T3, only T2 repetitive 
thinking predicted T3 meaning searching (β = .12, z = 2.21, p < .05), whereas T2 












Figure 1. Final model of the relations between meaning searching, repetitive thinking, 
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Finally, these relationships between meaning searching and repetitive thinking, 
and between repetitive thinking and depression emerged in the context of relatively high 
predictive relations between the repeated measures of repetitive thinking, meaning 
searching, and depression. The beta weights between consecutive measures ranged from 
.36 to .58 (ps < .001).  
Apart from the longitudinal relations between meaning searching and repetitive 
thinking, the model also showed that meaning searching, repetitive thinking, and 
depression were significantly positively associated with one another cross-sectionally 
while controlling for neuroticism, control beliefs, age, and gender, with the beta weights 
ranging from .16 to .32 (ps< .05).  
Discussion 
 In the present study, the relation between dysphoria and subtypes of depressive 
rumination, which are meaning searching and repetitive thinking, was observed in a 
sample of retirees. At the beginning of the study, individuals reported their neuroticism, 
control beliefs, age, and gender. Individuals also reported their depressive symptoms, 
meaning searching, and repetitive thinking three times over a two-year period. Dysphoria, 
meaning searching, and repetitive thinking were correlated with one another cross-
sectionally, indicating that those who experience more dysphoria also engage in more 
meaning searching and repetitive thinking, even after taking neuroticism, control beliefs, 
age, and gender into account.  
Longitudinally, individuals‘ propensity to engage in meaning searching and 
repetitive thinking slightly declined over time. Specifically, individuals‘ engagement in 
meaning searching consistently declined longitudinally. For repetitive thinking, there was 
 47 
a significant drop between T1 and T2; however, individuals‘ scores between T2 and T3 
were not significantly different. It should also be noted that as a group, individuals in the 
present study engaged in little meaning searching or repetitive thinking and the decline 
were small in magnitude. The average scores for both subtypes of depressive rumination 
remained relatively low throughout the study. In regards to dysphoria, participants in this 
study reported low levels of dysphoria and this remained stable over time. Only 12.51% 
of the participants met the criteria for depression.  
It was hypothesized that repetitive thinking, which seems to be a more 
maladaptive subtype of depressive rumination, would lead to more dysphoria over time 
when taking neuroticism, control beliefs, age, and gender into account. This hypothesis 
was not supported. The present findings indicated that neither repetitive thinking nor 
meaning searching predicted dysphoria longitudinally. On the contrary, dysphoria 
predicted repetitive thinking over time, with those reporting more depressive symptoms 
becoming more likely to engage in repetitive thinking a year later. However, this relation 
was relatively weak and only emerged between T1 dysphoria and T2 repetitive thinking. 
The same relation did not emerge between T2 dysphoria and T3 repetitive thinking. On 
the basis of these findings, individuals‘ dysphoria may slightly contribute to more 
engagement in repetitive thinking over time.  
Thus, the present findings contradicted the findings from previous research which 
suggest that more maladaptive subtypes of depressive rumination are associated with 
more dysphoria over time (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Treynor et al., 2003). One explanation 
for this discrepancy may be that the present study took into consideration more variables 
that might influence the relation between subtypes of depressive rumination and 
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dysphoria. As mentioned above, several longitudinal studies failed to take depressive 
rumination (or its subtypes) at follow-ups into consideration, which consequently 
rendered their findings inconclusive. Their findings that the more maladaptive subtype of 
depressive rumination leads to more dysphoria over time might have been confounded 
because depressive rumination at follow-up was not controlled for.  
 Another potential explanation as to why repetitive thinking did not predict 
dysphoria longitudinally is that repetitive thinking items are not as negative as items of 
other maladaptive rumination subtypes such as brooding. The RSS items for the 
repetitive thinking subtype (e.g., ―I get absorbed about why I am sad and find it difficult 
to think about other things‖) suggest that ruminating individuals experience difficulty in 
stopping their sad thoughts. Even though this uncontrollability of repetitive thinking is 
likely negative, it may not be as negative as the brooding items from the RRS (Treynor et 
al., 2003), which suggest wishful thinking (―Think about a recent situation, wishing it had 
gone better‖), self-criticism (―Think ‗Why can‘t I handle things better?‘‖), and seeing 
oneself as a victim of the situation (―Think ‗What am I doing to deserve this?‘‖). 
 The unexpected finding that dysphoria predicted repetitive thinking over time is 
consistent with some previous research. The present finding that dysphoria predicted 
repetitive thinking over time corresponded to what Treynor and colleagues (2003) found 
in their study, which was that individuals who reported more dysphoria were likely to 
report more brooding a year later. It should be noted that in their model, dysphoria also 
predicted more reflection, which is inconsistent with the present findings because there 
was no relation between dysphoria and subsequent meaning searching.  
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In regards to the relation between meaning searching and repetitive thinking, the 
present findings indicated that the two subtypes predicted each other longitudinally even 
when neuroticism, control beliefs, age, and gender were taken into account. Individuals 
who thought about their sadness repetitively reported more meaning searching over time, 
and those who searched for meaning reported engaging in more repetitive thinking a year 
later. The latter finding is consistent with what Ramel and colleagues (2004) and 
Papageorgiou and Wells (2003) have suggested, which is that seemingly less maladaptive 
rumination can later lead to more maladaptive depressive rumination. Note that the 
effects in the present study were relatively small, and the relation between T2 meaning 
searching and T3 repetitive thinking was not significant. Furthermore, similar relations 
between the two subtypes of depressive rumination were not found in the study by 
Treynor and colleagues (2003), in which T1 reflection did not lead to more T2 brooding, 
and nor did T1 brooding lead to more T2 reflection.  
To summarize, the present findings suggest that meaning searching and repetitive 
thinking may be correlated with dysphoria concurrently, but neither predicts dysphoria 
over time. On the contrary, dysphoria may predict more maladaptive depressive 
rumination longitudinally. The lack of support for Response Styles Theory (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991) gives rise to a question as to whether depressive rumination subtypes 
actually lead to more severe dysphoria or whether it would be more appropriate to 
consider depressive rumination (and its subtypes) as one of the symptoms of depression. 
As reviewed above, depressive rumination has been consistently correlated with 
depressive symptoms (Thomsen, 2006). It can be argued that rather than be a predictor, 
depressive rumination may simply be present when individuals experience other 
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depressive symptoms such as sad mood, sense of worthlessness, reduced interest in 
pleasurable activities, weight fluctuation, or sleep difficulty.  
In addition, as mentioned earlier in this paper, one characteristic of repetitive 
thinking is its uncontrollability, such that individuals feel absorbed in their ruminative 
thought and find it difficult to stop ruminating or to think about other things. This 
characteristic corresponds to one of the criteria for a major depressive episode listed in 
the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), which is ―diminished ability 
to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day (either by subjective account 
or as observed by others)‖(p.356). This difficulty in concentration is assessed by an item 
from the measure of depressive symptoms used in the present study (the CES-D; Radloff, 
1977), which is ―I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.‖ Respondents rate 
how frequently they experience this during the past week. On the basis of this shared 
characteristic between depressive rumination and depressive symptomatology, it can be 
argued that depressive rumination might be more suitably conceptualized as a symptom 
of depression.  
If depressive rumination is considered a symptom of depression, intervention 
aimed at reducing rumination may be beneficial.In a preliminarystudy by Watkins and 
colleagues (2007), outpatient cases with residual depression and high depressive 
rumination underwent rumination-focused cognitive behavior therapy (RFCBT). The 
treatment aimed to coach participants to shift to a more effective style of thinking, for 
instance, by helping them to differentiate when it would be unhelpful to think about 
problems, andto develop strategies to avoid engaging in rumination. They found that the 
treatment was effective, with participants showing a significant decrease in depressive 
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symptoms, and half of them met the full remission criteria. This seems to suggest that 
when rumination declines, depression will also lessen. However, the sample was very 
small, and there was no comparison control group. This renders the findings rather 
inconclusive as to whether the symptom reduction was due to a decrease in rumination. 
Watkins and colleagues (2011) consequently conducted another study to compare the 
effectiveness of CBT and RFCBT for residual depression. They found that those in 
RFCBT reported significantly less depressive symptoms and depressive rumination post-
treatment than those in the CBT condition even after controlling for baseline depressive 
symptoms. Furthermore, a decline in depressive rumination mediated the treatment effect 
on depressive symptoms.  
Another technique that has been proposed to lower depressive rumination is 
mindfulness meditation.Mindfulness is typically defined as a state in which individuals 
attend to and are aware of what is happening in the present without making judgment 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003; Holzel, Lazar, Gard, Schuman-Oliver, Vago, & Ott, 2011). Holzel 
and colleagues (2011) reviewed research on mindfulness and proposedthe means by 
which mindfulness is beneficial: attention regulation, body awareness, emotion regulation 
(e.g., reappraisal, exposure, extinction, and reconsolidation), and change in perspective 
on the self. In terms of attention regulation, those who practice mindfulness meditation 
have shown better attentional performance (Holzel et al., 2011).This may potentially help 
reduce the chance individuals will ruminate, because individuals who practice 
mindfulness may be able to control their thought better and not engage in rumination in 
the first place, or even if they ruminate, they are capable to disengage from rumination.  
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According to Holzel and collaegues (2011), another explanation why mindfulness 
is beneficial is because it tends to lead a person to engage in reappraisal. Reappraisal is 
regarded as an aspect of emotional regulation, and it occurs when individuals reinterpret 
the meaning of a certain stimulus and consequently change their emotional responses to it 
(Holzel et al., 2011).  There is some evidence that mindfulness training helped 
individuals reappraisetheir experience of stress in a more positive way, and this 
subsequently led to decreased distress (Garland, Gaylord, & Fredrickson, 2011). By 
practicing mindfulness, dysphoric individuals may be able to appraise their experience of 
sadness, including the causes of sadness, in a different or perhaps in a more meaningful 
way. This potentially helps them gain a sense of insight, which, as mentioned above, is 
one of the reasons why individuals engage in rumination (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993).  
It can be argued that another reason why mindfulness is of benefit when one tries 
to avoid ruminating is because one has to detach oneself from one‘s emotional thought to 
a certain extent. Garland, Gaylord, and Park (2009) proposed that mindfulness involves 
decentering, which they defined as ―a stepping back from mental experience‖ (p. 37). 
Although not exactly the same, decentering seems to correspond to the idea of third-
person perspective in repetitive thought suggested by Kross and colleagues (2005) that 
noted above. Decentering may help individuals step back and take a perspective of an 
outsider, and may consequently reduce the chances to engage in ruminative thought from 
a first-person perspective.  
Some research findings support that mindfulness may lead to a reduction in 
rumination. Deyo, Wilson, Ong, and Koopman (2009) found that in adult volunteerswho 
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underwent an eight-week mindfulness-based stress reduction program reported a 
significant decrease in ruminative self-focus and depressive symptoms. However, it was 
unclear whether this reduction in ruminative self-focus partially resulted from the 
reduction of depressive symptoms. Nevertheless, mindfulness-based treatment may 
present itself as a beneficial treatment option for individuals who tend to engage in 
rumination, and since rumination may arguably be considered a characteristic of 
depression, reducing depressive rumination by practicing mindfulness meditation may 
help ameliorate one‘s dysphoric or depressed state. A cautionary note is that Kabat-Zinn 
(1990) stated that mindfulness meditation may lead to the resurgence of distressing 
thoughts and feelings that have been ignored for some time. As such, the emotional 
regulation of mindfulness may involve greater distress on the short term, followed by 
extinction and reconsolidation. 
In regards to limitations of the present study, the study was conducted with a 
specific sample of recent retirees who generally did not suffer from clinical depression. 
Therefore, the findings may not be applicable in other samples. It would be of interest to 
test the model in the present study with a wider range of sample, such as younger adults 
or people who suffer from clinical depression.  
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Consent Form for Retirement Study 
 
This is to state that I, _________________________________, agree to participate in the 
study on retirement being conducted by Drs. Pushkar, Conway, Li, and Wrosch from the 
Centre for Research in Human Development and the Department of Psychology at 
Concordia University. 
 
I have been informed that: 
 
1. My participation in this study entails my completing a battery of questionnaires, 
including questionnaires about the activities I do, my physical health, as well as 
about various life domains including my well-being, memory, cognition, and my 
attitudes. 
2. All information about me or any other person will remain completely confidential. 
Results from this study will be accessible only to the researchers involved in this 
study. They will be able to use the information for scientific purposes, such as for 
publications in scientific journals or presentations at scientific conferences, as 
long as I cannot be identified as a participant in this study. 
3. I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at anytime 
without negative consequences. 
4. This interview should last approximately four hours. I will receive a monetary 
compensation of $50 for the four hours. 
5. Because this study is a longitudinal study, I may be contacted again for an annual 
interview in 2006, 2007, and 2008. Each annual interview will last approximately 
four hours. I will receive $50 for each annual interview in which I will take part.  
6. I will receive a copy of the general results as they become available if I have 
indicated my name and address on the previous page. 
7. I understand the purpose of this study; I know that there is no deception involved. 
8. The person in charge of this study is Dr. Dolores Pushkar. She can be reached at 
(514) 848-2424, extension 7540, email: retraite@alcor.concordia.ca 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE. 
 Name (please print):_______________________________ 
 Signature:_______________________________________ 
 Date: __________________________________________ 
 Witness:________________________________________ 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please 
contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at 




Demographics Questionnaire for Recent Retirees 
 
1. What is your sex? Male___________ Female___________ 
2. What is the date of your birth?  
 Year_________ Month _________ Date____ 
3. What is your age? ___________ 
4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
        (Please circle that which corresponds best) 
Primary School: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Secondary School: 7 8 9 10 11 12 
CEGEP/College: Diploma     
University: Bachelor‘s Master‘s Doctorate 
 
  Other (please indicate what, how many years) ________________________ 
5. What is your occupation? 
_____________________________________________________ 
6. When did you retire?   
Year___________ Month ___________ Date_____ 
7. How many years were you employed?  ______________________________ 
8. Do you receive a pension from your employer?  
     Yes_____ No_____ 
9. At the time of your retirement, what was your annual salary? 
_______________________________ 
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10. What is your present annual income (include all sources, e.g. RRSP‘s, etc.) 
_______________________________ 
11. What is your total family income from all sources? 
_______________________________ 
12. Compared to other people of your age that you know, how would you rate your 
financial situation? 
(Please circle the corresponding number) 
1) A lot worse than most 
2) Worse than most 
3) A little worse than most 
4) About the same as most 
5) A little better than most 
6) Better than most 
7) A lot better than most 
13. What languages do you speak? 
French__________ 
English_________ 
Other (please specify): ______________________ 
14. What language do you read and write? 
French__________ 
English_________ 
Other (please specify): ______________________ 
15. What is your civil status? 
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Married                   __________ 
Single                     __________ 
Divorced                __________ 
Widowed               __________ 
Common-law         __________ 
16. How many times have you been married? _________ 
17. Do you have children?    Yes_____ No_____ 
18. If yes, how many girls? _____    
How many boys? _____ 
19. Who do you live with?  
Alone                            ___________ 
Spouse                          ___________ 
Brother/Sister               ___________ 
Friend                           ___________ 
Children                       ___________ 
Other (please specify)  ___________ 
20. How did you find out about this study? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
